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1 Motivation
A number of writers have been attracted to the idea that some of the puzzling features
of quantum mechanics might be manifestations of ‘reverse’ or ‘retro’ causality, at a level
underlying that of the usual quantum description. The main motivation for this view stems
from EPR/Bell phenomena, where it offers two virtues. First, as was noted by its earliest
proponent,1 it has the potential to provide a timelike decomposition of the nonlocal cor-
relations revealed in EPR cases – i.e., as we would now put it,2 for the violation of the
Bell inequalities in the quantum world. Second, Bell’s derivation of his famous inequality
depends explicitly on the assumption that hidden states do not depend on future mea-
surement settings – so that its violation simply invites a retrocausal explanation, at least
from the point of view of anyone who has already been bitten by the retrocausal bug.
Most people working in the foundations of quantum mechanics remain resolutely
unbitten, however. It is common for the retrocausal option to be ignored altogether,
or, as in this rather careful recent survey article, relegated to the footnotes with other
unmemorabilia:
To be scrupulous, there are perhaps four other ways [i.e., other than nonlo-
cality] that the correlations in [an EPR-Bohm] experiment could be explained
away. (1) One could simply ‘refuse to consider the correlations mysterious’.
(2) One could deny that the experimenters have free will to choose the set-
tings of their measurement devices at random, as required for a statistically
∗This note is based on a talk given at workshops at the University of Sydney and at Griffith University,
Brisbane, in November, 2007. The slides for the Griffith University version of the talk are available online here:
http://www.usyd.edu.au/time/prie/preprints/RetroTalkGriffithNov07.pdf . I am grateful
to John Cusbert, Pete Evans, Eric Cavalcanti and other participants in those workshops for helpful feedback,
and to Steve Weinstein and especially Ken Wharton, for much helpful discussion since then. I am also indebted
to the Australian Research Council and the University of Sydney, for research support.
†Centre for Time, University of Sydney; email: huwmail.usyd.edu.au .
1The view was first proposed by Olivier Costa de Beauregard (1911–2007), a student of Louis de Broglie,
whose first publication on the subject is (Costa de Beauregard 1953). Prof. Costa de Beauregard (2005)
reported that he had proposed the idea several years earlier, in 1947, but that de Broglie had forbidden him to
publish it, until Feynman’s work on the positron gave some respectability to the idea of “things going backwards
in time”. For more recent retrocausal proposals, see the references in (Sutherland 2006).
2The qualification is necessary because Costa de Beauregard’s version of the proposal pre-dates Bell’s
work by more than a decade, of course.
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valid Bell-experiment. (3) One could entertain the idea of backward-in-time
causation. (4) One could conclude that ordinary (Boolean) logic is not valid
in our Universe. I do not consider these escape routes because they seem
to undercut the core assumptions necessary to undertake scientific experi-
ments. (Wiseman 2005, my emphasis)
What can a fan of quantum retrocausality do at this point, to try to bring the proposal
out of the footnotes and onto the main page? Well, there are two obvious strategies.
The first is to construct explicit theories and models of quantum phenomena, embodying
retrocausal principles. Various proposals of this kind are in the literature.3 The second
is to explore the conceptual foundations of the proposal – e.g., to examine the basis of
our ordinary causal intuitions, in order, perhaps, to uncover some deep-seated errors in
reasoning, underlying intuitive objections to retrocausality. Again, some work of this kind
is in the literature – see, e.g., (Price 1996).
This note introduces a third strategy, which offers a promising complement to the
other two, in my view. This third strategy aims to investigate retrocausality in general –
and hopefully, eventually, quantum retrocausality – by developing simple ‘toy models’, to
explain and elucidate its characteristics, and to explore its potential and peculiarities.
1.1 Playing with models
Much of the inspiration for this project comes from (Spekkens 2004), who proposes and
investigates a ‘toy theory’, as he calls it, to explore the issue as to which of the distinctive
features of quantum mechanics might be explained by the hypothesis that the quantum
description is ‘epistemic’, rather than ‘ontic’. By analogy, one aspect of my third strategy
– admittedly, one that I make almost no progress with in this note – is to use toy models to
explore the question as to what quantum-like phenomena retrocausality might in principle
explain. The other aspect is to use such models as intuition pumps, or teaching aids, for
clarifying and motivating the unfamiliar ideas involved in retrocausal proposals – e.g., for
looking for latitude in what Wiseman (op. cit.) termed ‘the core assumptions necessary
to undertake scientific experiments.’
The toy model described here shows how something that ‘looks like’ retrocausality
can emerge from global constraints on a very simple system of ‘interactions’, when the
system in question is given a natural interpretation in the light of familiar assumptions
about experimental intervention and observation. It yields nothing of a distinctively quan-
tum nature, except a crude form of nonlocality. I present it in the hope that it may turn
out to be a stepping stone to something more interesting, and especially in the hope that
it will help to explain what the game is, to people who still find retrocausality as unattrac-
tive a response to the quantum puzzles as fatalism, non-Boolean logic, or a shrug of the
shoulders.
3See, e.g., (Sutherland 2006) and the references therein, and (Wharton 2007).
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2 The Helsinki model4
The Helsinki model is defined by the following ingredients and principles:
• There are two kinds of primitive nodes, each the inverse of the other under re-
flection around the horizontal axis, and each comprising a meeting-point of three
edges. If we interpret the edges as ‘particle world-lines’, then the nodes represent
two kinds of primitive ‘interaction’: ‘pair production’ and ‘pair annihilation’. (See
Fig. 1)
• Each edge has one of three ‘flavours’, A,B or C.
• Each node must be strictly inhomogeneous – i.e., comprising three edges of
different flavours – or strictly homogeneous (three edges of the same flavour).
• Pair production and pair annihilation must alternate, when the primitive nodes are
linked together.
• Successive homogeneous nodes are prohibited. (See Figs. 2 & 3)
‘Pair production’
A
BC
‘Pair annihilation’
A
CB
Figure 1: The two basic ‘interactions’.
2.1 Adding ‘time evolution’, ‘preparation’ and ‘observation’
The bare dynamics of this model is ‘up-down’ symmetric – or time-symmetric, if we treat
up-down as a temporal axis (Fig. 4). Given such a temporal interpretation, however, then
it is very natural to imagine we can control the inputs and read off the outputs, as in Fig.
5. Here yellow circles represent ‘interventions’, or ‘preparations’ (values we can ‘choose
to assign’); green squares represent ‘observations’ – values we simply ‘read off’; and the
wavy lines represent the ‘hidden’ sectors, that we can’t directly control or observe. Note
that the two pair annihilations in Fig. 5 provide ‘measurements’ of the hidden sectors,
in the sense that if we know one input and the output, the rules uniquely determine the
value of the second (‘hidden’) input.
4When I first presented this model at a workshop in Sydney in 2007, I explained that I had two reasons for
calling it the Helsinki model: (i) I thought of retrocausality in QM as an elegant rival to Copenhagen (though
somewhere in the same neighbourhood, in some respects); and (ii) the model itself first occurred to me while I
was stuck between flights at Helsinki airport, a couple of months previously. Contrary to an interjection at that
point by my student, John Cusbert, the name has nothing to do with “control by the Finnish state.”
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C
A
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A
A
Figure 2: Disallowed – repeated homogeneous nodes.
A
B
C
A
B
C
A
Figure 3: Allowed – no repeated homogeneous nodes.
A
B
C
A
B
C
A
‘Past’
‘Future’
Figure 4: Adding a ‘time axis’.
4
AB
C
A
B
C
A
Past
Future
Figure 5: Adding ‘preparations’ and ‘observations’.
For future reference, let’s also emphasise that the direction of causation has been
‘put in by hand’, in this model, by our stipulation of what we can control. (It is certainly
isn’t given to us by the basic rules!) Our next tasks are (i) to explain what retrocausality
amounts to, when the direction of causation is simply put in by hand in this way; and
(ii) to show that the model requires retrocausality.
3 Reverse causation v. retrocausation
Since the direction of causation is put in by hand, we could put it in ‘backwards’, as
in Fig. 6. Call this reverse causation: it corresponds to what causation looks like from
the point of view of a creature whose time-sense is the reverse of our own. Since the
Helsinki model is trivially time-symmetric (with the temporal interpretation we’ve given it),
A
B
C
A
B
C
A
Past
Future
Figure 6: Reverse causation – interventions ‘from the future’, observations ‘to the past’.
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I2
E2
I3
E4
I1
E1
E3
Past
Future
Figure 7: Retrocausation – an intervention I1 may act ‘backwards’ on E3.
and the causal arrow is simply put in by hand, it is no big surprise to learn that it could
be put in with the opposite orientation. And if this is what retrocausality amounted to, it
could hardly be big news, surely, if we applied it to quantum mechanics?
Quite so, and the interesting case is entirely different. (One of the virtues of the
Helsinki model is that it displays the difference so clearly.) The interesting case is when
ordinary interventions (‘from the past’) make a difference prior to the intervention – e.g.,
in the notation of Fig. 7, if the choice of the ‘measurement setting’ I1 affects the ‘hidden
state’ E3. (Here, think of the ‘Ii’ and ‘Ej ’ as variables, representing the values of the
three inputs, or Interventions, and some (potential) Effects, respectively. Each variable
is restricted to the three values A, B or C, of course, by the rules of the model. The
position of the input node labelled ‘I1 ’ is intended to indicate that the choice of the value
of I1 can be made after the time of the central ’pair production’.) This kind of influence –
when the choice of I1 makes a difference to E3 – is what I want to call retrocausation.
Unlike the case of reverse causation, which we can simply put in by hand – just
a different choice of hand, so to speak – it is far from obvious that the Helsinki model
involves retrocausation. To show that it does in fact do so, we need to investigate the
patterns of correlations between inputs and hidden states allowed by the rules of the
model. What we are looking for is a case in which a change in the left or right-hand input
variables requires a change in the hidden state.
4 Retrocausality in Helsinki
To reveal the retrocausality in the Helsinki model, let’s first consider the admissible three-
input interactions (as in Fig. 5, for example). Exploiting the obvious symmetries of the
model, there are effectively only four different choices of the three inputs. Writing the
choice of inputs shown in Fig. 5 as ‘BAC ’, for example, the four possibilities are AAA,
AAB, BAB, and BAC itself. For each of these choices of inputs, we want to know which
of the nine possible hidden states – i.e., 〈AA〉, 〈AB〉, 〈AC〉, 〈BA〉, 〈BB〉, 〈BC〉,
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〈CA〉, 〈CB〉 and 〈CC〉 – are compatible with that choice. The fact that we have re-
stricted ourselves to the case in which the central input is A immediately excludes most
of these hidden states: the only admissible possibilities are 〈AA〉, 〈BC〉 and 〈CB〉.
(The notation ‘〈XY 〉’ is intended to indicate that X is the flavour of the hidden edge on
the left, and Y that of the hidden edge on the right.)
This gives us only twelve cases to consider – four choices of inputs, and three hidden
states for each – and the results are summarised in the State Table in Fig. 8. Note in
particular that the inputs AAA and AAB exclude the hidden state 〈AA〉. This is the key
to the model’s retrocausality.
〈AA〉 〈BC〉 〈CB〉
AAA ✗ ✓ ✓
AAB ✗ ✓ ✓
BAB ✓ ✓ ✓
BAC ✓ ✓ ✓
Figure 8: The State Table.
4.1 Retrocausality revealed
Consider the case shown in Fig. 9. If either of the ‘measurement settings’ (i.e., the left
or right inputs) were an A, as in Fig. 10, then the hidden state couldn’t be 〈AA〉. (In
the case shown in Fig. 10, with input A on the right, the two possibilities are a hidden
state 〈BC〉 with left and right outputs both B; or a hidden state 〈CB〉 with left and right
outputs A and C.) So in any actual case of the kind shown in Fig. 9, the hidden state
depends retrocausally on the fact that neither ‘observer’ chose to input the measurement
setting A rather than the measurement setting B. (As in Fig. 7, we could easily vary the
position of the input nodes, to make it clear that the choice of measurement setting does
not have to be made until after the pair production that produces the hidden state.)
Note also – comparing Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 – that the output on the left depends on
the measurement setting on the right. If the actual case is as shown in Fig. 9, then again
we have a counterfactual dependency, apparently: if we had chosen the input A on the
right, we would have obtained either the output B or the output A on the left, rather than
the output A. So we also have a kind of nonlocality.
5 Is the model consistent?
At this point there are some questions we might raise about the consistency of the model
as a whole. For one thing, we might wonder whether are there larger systems con-
structed according to the same rules in which some choice of inputs allows no consistent
assignment of outputs? The answer to this question seems to be ‘no’. For suppose the
contrary, and let N be the minimum length for the maximal string of sequential nodes in
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AC
B
A
B
C
A
Past
Future
Figure 9: Hidden state 〈AA〉 is possible with these inputs.
A
B|C
A
C|B
B
B|A
B|C
Past
Future
Figure 10: A different hidden state is enforced by the change of right input.
such an inconsistent structure. If N > 1, we could obtain a shorter inconsistent struc-
ture by choosing an inconsistent structure of length N , removing its lower-most level, and
supplying by hand to the next level the inputs otherwise supplied by lower-most level. But
this would contradict the assumption that N is the minimum length for such a structure,
so N = 1. But there is no such system of length 1, apparently, and so no system of
greater length, either.
This consistency property means that in interpreting the model in terms of our intu-
itive ideas of intervention, control and observation, we don’t need to impose any restric-
tions on the ‘ free choices’ of our toy physicists, in order to preserve consistency. This
is an interesting result, especially in the light of the fact that two of the standard con-
cerns about retrocausal models are that they might conflict with free will, and/or lead to
inconsistencies or paradoxes of some kind.
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5.1 Causal loops
We can take this concern with consistency under the natural interpretation a stage fur-
ther, by allowing our toy physicists a freedom real physicists have in the case of EPR/Bell
experiments, namely, to perform the two measurements at sufficiently different times, so
that the result of one can be allowed to influence the setting of the other (by an ordinary
‘classical’ causal channel). This possibility is a recognised source of potential causal
loops, in retrocausal models of EPR/Bell situations; see, e.g., (Berkovitz 2002).
A
A
C|B
B|C
A
B|C
C|B
Figure 11: A causal loop? Left output controls right input.
Let’s represent this possibility by adding to our diagrams the kind of causal link rep-
resented by the red arrow in Fig. 11. Keep in mind that despite the way it is depicted
in Fig. 11, this is not to be thought of as a retrocausal influence. (Imagine the diagram
elongated on the right, so that the right input actually occurs after the left output.) Keep
in mind also that in this version, the new causal link lies in the classical realm of our toy
physicists – it isn’t part of the model itself. (As the model stands, the main obstacle to
incorporating it within the model is the requirement that the two kinds of node must alter-
nate – otherwise, we could simply make the output of the pair annihilation on the left an
input of the pair annihilation on the right, eliminating the ‘external’ red arrow altogether.)
In the case shown in Fig. 11, the output B on the left produces input C on the
right, and the output C on the left produces input B on the right. There is a consistent
assignment of hidden states and right output in either case, showing that the constraint
admits two consistent solutions (with the given choice of left and centre inputs – i.e., A
in both positions).
Generalising this case, consider the three possible ways in which a left output B can
fix a right input, as in Fig. 12. Again, all three cases allow a consistent assignment of
the right output. Exploiting the symmetries of the model once more, this is sufficient to
demonstrate that whenever the left and centre inputs are the same, any set of left-output-
to-right-input constraints allows at least one consistent assignment of hidden states and
right output – i.e., no such constraint can ‘shut the system down’.
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AC|B|A
A|B|C
B
A
B
C
Figure 12: Generalising the previous case.
A
C|B|A
A|B|C
B
B
A
C
Figure 13: A new case, with different inputs in left and centre positions.
This leaves the cases in which the initial and left inputs are different. Here, consider,
for example, the three possible ways in which a left output A can fix a right input, as in
Fig. 13. Again, all three possibilities allow a consistent right output. And again, any set of
left-output-to-right-input constraints allows at least one consistent assignment of hidden
states and right output – again, no such constraint can shut the system down.
This kind of constraint is non-trivial, however. Fig. 14 shows a case in which its effect
is to exclude a hidden state – 〈AA〉 – that would otherwise be permitted. So the Helsinki
model is rich enough to show how this kind of causal loop can impose new constraints,
without leading to inconsistency.
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A?
A
A
B
C
A
Figure 14: A substantial constraint.
6 Improving the model
I conclude with a wish-list of enhancements – further steps it would be interesting to be
able to take in future iterations of the Helsinki model, or in something like it:
1. Adding probabilities, and showing that in virtue of the retrocausality, they are
bound to have some of the characteristics of the probabilities associated with QM
amplitudes – e.g., that probabilities of results of measurements cannot generally
be regarded as probabilities of pre-existing states, regarded as independent of the
choice of future measurements.
2. Developing an analogy between the standard QM state function and what we know
in the Helsinki model if we don’t know the future measurement settings – in other
words, an analogy with the kind of epistemic ‘coarse graining’ of the Helsinki model
which would be necessary to represent the state of knowledge of a physicist (or
toy physicist) who wants to make predictions with respect to a range of possible
‘next measurements’.
3. Hence connecting the Helsinki model, or some variant of it, to Spekkens’ ‘epis-
temic’ toy models.
4. Investigating the nonlocality of Helsinki-like models, in search of the retrocausal
toy modeller’s Holy Grail: a model with Bell-like correlations without signalling.
I don’t know to what extent such enhancements are possible, but I’ll be pleased if the
model inspires anyone to try to find out.
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Abstract
A number of writers have been attracted to the idea that some of the peculiarities of
quantum theory might be manifestations of ‘backward’ or ‘retro’ causality, underlying the
quantum description. This idea has been explored in the literature in two main ways:
firstly in a variety of explicit models of quantum systems, and secondly at a concep-
tual level. This note introduces a third approach, intended to complement the other
two. It describes a simple toy model, which, under a natural interpretation, shows how
retrocausality can emerge from simple global constraints. The model is also useful in
permitting a clear distinction between the kind of retrocausality likely to be of interest in
QM, and a different kind of reverse causality, with which it is liable to be confused. The
model is proposed in the hope that future elaborations might throw light on the potential
of retrocausality to account for quantum phenomena.
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